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CASE SUMMARIES
WILLIAM B. RITCHIE V. ORENTHAL JAMES
SIMPSON
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir..1999)
INTRODUCTION
The respondent Orenthal James Simpson applied for federal
registration of the trademarks "O.J. SIMPSON," "O.J.," and "THE
JUICE. 1 An examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) approved the registration and had the marks
published in the Official Gazette, as required by trademark law.'
Once the trademarks were published in the Official Gazette, the
marks were entitled to registration unless someone filed a notice of
opposition
To determine if a term is entitled to trademark registration, the
PTO will allow the term to pass for publication in the Official
Gazette.4  Once published, interested members of a substantial
portion of society may oppose the registration if they believe the
term is scandalous or immoral.' Petitioner William Ritchie filed an
opposition to the registration of these marks claiming that the
marks were immoral or scandalous matter.6 The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board dismissed the opposition.' The Board stated
that Ritchie did not have standing to oppose the trademark
registrations.' Ritchie appealed the Board's decision, and the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.9 The Court of Appeals
stated that as long as a person has a "real interest" in the outcome
1 Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2 Id. at 1093.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1094.
5 Id.
6 Ritchie. 170 F.3d.at 1093.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
1
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and a "reasonable" belief of damages then a person has standing to
oppose a registration."
FACTS
Simpson attempted to register the trademarks for use on
figurines, trading cards, sportswear, medallions, coins, and prepaid
telephone cards." In Ritchie's opposition to registration, he
claimed the trademarks were "immoral or scandalous matter.'
2
According to the Lanham Act, a term may be refused trademark
registration if it "consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute .... 13
The Board stated that only people with a real interest and a belief
of damage may oppose a registration. 4 According to the Board, a
real interest meant that a person had a "personal interest in the
proceeding beyond that of the general public."' s By following this
definition of real interest, Ritchie was required to show that his
interest was not shared by a large part of society.6
As to the belief of damage, the Board only required that a person
opposing a registration believe that he would be damaged if the
registration were allowed. 7 The damage one believed had to be
established with proof."8
The Board concluded that Ritchie did not have a real interest in
the matter. 9 Therefore, Ritchie did not have standing to oppose
the registration of Simpson's trademarks.20 Ritchie appealed. The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Board's decision.
10 Id. at 1095.
11 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1093.
12 Id.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
14 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095, 1098.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1097.
17 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1097.
20 Id.
202 [Vol. X:201
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals stated that the issue was not whether the
trademarks were immoral or scandalous, but rather, whether
Ritchie had standing to oppose the registration.21 The court stated
that Article III of the Constitution required a plaintiff to show that
a "case or controversy" existed between himself and the defendant
in order to have standing.22 This requirement, though, does not
apply to matters before administrative agencies and boards.23 For
this reason, the court had to look at the statute rather than the
Constitution to determine standing in opposition proceedings.24
The Lanham Act states that anyone who thinks he will be
damaged by a mark placed upon the principal register may file an
opposition in the PTO.25 One reason for refusing trademark
registration is because the term is considered immoral or
scandalous, and allowing the registration may disparage a person's
beliefs.26 Contemporary attitudes will determine whether a mark is
immoral or scandalous.2 A substantial portion of society's views,
not a majority opinion, will determine the contemporary attitudes
regarding a trademark.2" According to the language of the statute,
a person only needs to believe that he will be damaged by a mark's
registration.29 In addition, the court stated two judicially-created
requirements in order to have standing-the opposer must have a
real interest in the opposition, and he must have a reasonable belief
of sustaining some type of damage.3"
21 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1094.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
27 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1094
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1095.
30 Id.
1999]
3
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A specific commercial interest not shared by the general public
is not required to have standing.31 It also does not matter if the
opposer belongs to a large group of members sharing the opposer's
attitude toward the marks.32 The number of people that believe
they will be damaged by a mark's registration is irrelevant.33 The
main concern is whether the opposer has a reasonable belief of
damage and a real interest in the opposition.34
According to the court, the opposer is not required to show, for
standing purposes, that the damage sustained will be economic.5
Injuries other than economic damage that will occur to the
petitioner, even if he is a member of a large group, will not
preclude standing.36
The Real Interest Test
The first requirement necessary for an opposer to have
standing is that he has a real interest in the proceeding's outcome.37
A real interest requirement prevents "mere intermeddlers" from
filing notices of opposition. When Ritchie filed his notice of
opposition, he claimed that registration of Simpson's marks would
disparage his family values.39  Ritchie described himself as a
family man that believed in the sanctity of marriage. 0 According
to Ritchie, marriage consisted of a man and woman that loved and
nurtured one another.4 As a member of society that believed in the
sanctity of marriage, Ritchie believed he would be harmed by
marks that belonged to a man who was accused of beating his wife
31 Id. at 1096.
32 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1096, (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
738 (1972).
36 Id.
37 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095.
38Id.
39 Id. at 1097.
40 Id.
41 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
[V/ol. X:201204
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and killing her.42 In addition to this claim, Ritchie believed the
marks were scandalous because they would "justify physical
violence against women. '
The Board had a narrow definition of what constituted a real
interest." According to the board, an opposer could only have a
real interest if he had a personal interest beyond the interest of
society.4" Unlike the Board's notion that an opposer could not
share the same belief as a substantial composite of society, the
court stated that the purpose of an opposition proceeding is to
establish that a substantial composite of society shares the same
interest.46 Because the appeal was reviewing the Board's dismissal
of Ritchie's opposition, the court had to consider the pleading as
true and had to look at the complaint in the light most favorable to
Ritchie.47 Applying this standard, the court had to believe that
Ritchie was sincere in his beliefs on marriage and that the marks'
source of identification to an alleged wife-murderer would harm
those beliefs.4" Therefore, allowing the registration to proceed
could potentially disparage Ritchie's belief in the sanctity of
marriage.49 For this reason, the court concluded that Ritchie had a
real interest in the outcome of the proceedings.5 0
Reasonable Belief of Damage
The second requirement necessary to establish standing in an
opposition proceeding is that the opposer must have a reasonable
belief of damage." A subjective belief is not sufficient; the belief
must have a "reasonable basis in fact."5 2
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1095.
45 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1098.
52 Id.
1999]
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A reasonable belief can be shown in several ways. 3 The court
stated that one way opposers can show a reasonable belief exists is
to claim that they possess a trait or characteristic that will be
endangered by the trademark. 4 The court cited Harjo v. Pro
Football, Inc., in which traits of Native Americans were harmed
through the mark of the team name Washington Redskins.5
Because a trait was implicated by the mark, Native Americans had
a reasonable belief of damage."
Another way to establish a reasonable belief of danger is to
claim that other people share the opposer's belief of damage by the
mark's registration. 7 To show that others share the same belief,
the opposer can introduce surveys or petitions." The court also
stated that affidavits from public interest groups representing
people with the same belief as the opposer is sufficient to show
that the public shares the opposer's concerns. 9
In his notice of opposition, Ritchie claimed that Simpson's
marks were offensive to him as a Christian, family-man.' The
court stated that this claim was not the same as having a trait or
characteristic that would be implicated by the marks." Ritchie's
beliefs in marriage were not the same kind. of immutable trait
possessed by the Native Americans which, therefore, prevented
him from using this argument as evidence of a reasonable belief of
damage. 2 For this reason, Ritchie had to show through other
means that his belief was reasonable and not subjective. 3
Ritchie's notice of opposition also contained a petition signed by
people who shared the belief that Simpson's marks were
scandalous and promoted spousal abuse.' Looking in a light most
53 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
54 Id.
55 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
56 Id.
57 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61Id.
62 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
63 Id.
64 Id.
206 [Vol. X:201
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favorable to the non-movant, the court accepted Ritchie's claims
and petition and denied the motion to dismiss. 5 Because Ritchie's
claims were considered valid, the court concluded that he had
sufficiently proven that a substantial composite of society shared
the same belief system and those beliefs would be damaged by the
successful registration of Simpson's marks.' For this reason, the
court held that Ritchie's beliefs had a reasonable basis in fact. 7
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals determined that the "case or controversy"
requirement for standing mentioned in Article HI of the
Constitution was not applicable to matters held before
administrative agencies or boards. The applicable statute's
language will determine standing for administrative agencies and
boards. The court decided that standing for opposition proceedings
requires a real interest in the outcome of the proceedings and a
reasonable belief of damage. The court rejected the Board's
standard that a real interest be a personal interest other than the
interest shared by society. The court held that Ritchie's notice of
opposition established that he had a real interest in the
proceeding's outcome and that his belief of damage was
reasonable. It also rejected the Board's standard that an opposer
only needs a subjective belief of damage. For these reasons, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Board's decision to
dismiss Ritchie's opposition.
James M. Lancheros
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
1999] 207
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